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Este artículo sitúa a las humanidades digitales en general y a la arqueología virtual en particular dentro del largo contexto de la evolución de las artes y las ciencias 
desde la antigüedad a través de la Edad Media y del Renacimiento hasta el presente, el período posmoderno. 
 





This paper places the digital humanities generally and virtual archaeology in particular into the larger context of the evolution of the arts and sciences from antiquity 
through the Middle Ages and Renaissance to the present, postmodern period.The argument is made that the basis of virtual reality representations of cultural objects 
is not primarily mimetic but interactive and that in this sense virtual archaeology reflects larger trends in contemporary science and the arts. 
 





C. P. Snow’s “Two Cultures” 
 
C. P. Snow’s famous Rede Lecture, “The Two Cultures,” was 
given in 1959, so this year is the fiftieth anniversary of a talk that 
had an enormous impact on its age. Given how influential that 
the lecture has been, we will undoubtedly see many 
retrospective assessments in the coming months. I want to 
begin with Snow because the thesis of his lecture relates directly 
to the topic I plan to address today: the art of science, the 
science of art, or, as we might paraphrase it, the interrelationship 
of science and art. As you will see when I reach my conclusion, 
I believe that this interrelationship has direct bearing on our 
activity as virtual archaeologists who strive to remain true to the 
exact science of antiquity even as we try to take advantage of the 
new technology of digital graphic arts as powerful tools of 
illustration and discovery.  
It is best to begin, then, with Snow’s own summary of his thesis. 
To quote him: 
 In our society…we have lost even the pretence of a 
common culture. Persons educated with the greatest 
intensity we know can no longer communicate with 
each other on the plane of their major intellectual 
concern….This is serious for our creative, intellectual 
and, above all, our normal life….The most pointed 
example of this lack of communication [concerns] 
two groups of people, representing what I have 
christened ‘the two cultures.’ One of these contain[s] 
scientists, whose weight, achievement and influence 
did not need stressing. The other contain[s] the 
literary intellectuals….In the condition of our age… 
Renaissance man is not possible. But we can do 
something. The chief means open to us is 
education….There is no excuse for letting another 
generation be as vastly ignorant, or as devoid of 
understanding and sympathy, as we are ourselves. 
(Snow 1969: 60-61) 
So Snow posited two cultures that cannot communicate with 
each other and glare at each other with ill-concealed hostility. 
One culture consists of scientists, the other of what he called 
“literary intellectuals.” Snow did not take sides in this division: 
as a writer and a scientist, his goal was to help bridge the gap, 
not in his own generation but in the next. And his means of 
doing that was educational reform: budding scientists need to 
study more humanities; students of the humanities need to learn 
something about math and science. 
Snow’s Rede Lecture grew out of some very particular 
circumstances, and it was explicitly aimed at England and its 
educational system in the 1950s. He did not contrast scientists 
and artists, as our theme might have required, but scientists and 
“literary intellectuals.” This is another example of how Snow’s 
thesis is rooted in a very specific situation. But despite these 
features, I think that Snow’s famous lecture is a good point of 
departure for this paper. For all its particularism, Snow’s talk 
does raise the perennial question of the relationship between the 
arts and the sciences and does so in the most extreme fashion: 
instead of seeing that relationship as nuanced across a wide 
spectrum of human behavior, he sees it as one characterized by 
hostility, lack of communication, and incomprehension. I would 
like to argue that Snow exaggerated the problem of the “two 
cultures” in 1959 when he gave his lecture, and he is even more 
wrong today—at least if we examine the question not, as Snow 
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did, on the level of the interpersonal interactions of specific 
scientists and literary intellectuals at the high tables of 
Cambridge and Oxford, but on the more profound level of the 
nature of art and of science.  
And so we must start with a definition of terms. What do we 
mean by “art” and by “science”?  
 
2 Defining Our Terms  
 
Let me avoid answering that for a moment by citing a passage in 
Passage to Modernity,  a wonderful book by Louis Dupré, who was 
Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Yale: 
…artists of the early Renaissance continued to view 
themselves as creating in unison with nature: mind 
and nature relate harmoniously to one another. As a 
microcosmos, the person occupies a central position 
within nature. According to Leonardo, the mind 
recognizes itself in the natural form upon which it 
then bestows its own formal perfection…. 
Observation of nature’s forms must conspire with 
creative imagination to realize the truth of nature. 
Because of the aesthetic importance of observation, 
Leonardo…considers science and art united. Thus 
he…concludes that painting is a science, indeed the 
higher one, since it intuitively reveals the unique, 
internal structure of its object, which cannot be 
learned as other sciences can (Dupré,  1993: 49; cf. 
Kuhn, 1970: 161). 
I start with Leonardo da Vinci and the Renaissance because I 
want to challenge any presupposition you may have that “art” 
and “science” have unambiguous significations and are natural 
and eternal opposites. In fact, the contrary is the case. Until the 
late 19th century when the term “physical sciences” was first 
coined, “art” and “science” were synonyms. We still hear a faint 
echo of this when we talk about “the art of solving puzzles, or 
“the art of computer game design,” to cite just two of thousands 
of hits that I got when Googling the phrase “the art of…” We 
also hear it when John Ziman, the distinguished theoretician of 
contemporary science, calls science “the art of the soluble” 
(Ziman, 1978: 28) and we can detect the synonymy in the title of 
Martin Kemp’s book, The Science of Art. Optical Themes in Western 
Art from Brunelleschi to Seurat (Kemp, 1990). It may not be 
irrelevant to note that Kemp is one of our greatest experts on da 
Vinci. Also pertinent is the fact that since its very origins with 
the Ionian thinkers such as Thales, philosophy has embraced 
both what we today call “science” and the “arts.”  
So our terms “art” and “science” have a history, and when we 
use them, they carry with them traces of that history. If we want 
to say anything useful about “the art of science and the science 
of art” and avoid terminological confusion or ambiguity, we will 
need to understand that history, at least in its broad strokes. 
 
3 The Ancient Model  
 
The Renaissance idea that the sciences and arts are synonymous 
goes back to antiquity. Our word “art” derives from the Latin 
ars, which the Romans used to translate the Greek term techne— 
the root of our word “technology.” “Science” derives from the 
Latin word scientia, a translation of the Greek term episteme. 
Scientia and episteme simply meant “knowledge”—knowledge 
about anything, not specifically about atoms, molecules, stars, 
life forms, etc., as it does today. Aristotle (Post An. 100a) 
understood episteme to mean a body of knowledge about existing 
things that are unchanging and eternal. Knowledge of such 
things can be codified, taught, and learned (Nic. Eth. 1139b). 
Complementary to, but less precise than episteme is techne. Techne 
is the knowledge of things that might exist (but do not 
necessarily exist) and that are brought into existence not by 
themselves but by an efficient cause that is their maker (Nic. 
Eth. 1140a). Such things might be actions or objects. Thus, 
Aristotle divides techne into two branches, the practical, 
concerned with actions, and the “poetic,” concerned with 
objects. A techne involves logos, or a “rational quality” (hexis meta 
logou) which must be applied in accordance with the truth 
(alethous; Nic. Eth. 1140a). So a techne has a necessary relationship 
to episteme, the study of the truth about unchanging and eternal 
things. For Aristotle and, as Dupré rightly noted, for the Greeks 
generally, knowledge is possible because nature is infused with 
Logos, or Reason, and humans are first and foremost rational 
creatures. This means that for the Greeks, the work of knowing 
is mimetic: to know something is to be able to describe it 
accurately in its essentials, which is to say its rational elements.  
Hence for Aristotle and the Greeks, the key tool in the 
knowledge worker’s toolkit is logic. As we will see, other tools 
came later. I will call this notion of what knowledge is and what 
tool is suited to discover it the Ancient Model (see figure 1), 
anticipating my invocation in section 4 of Alfred Crosby’s use of 
the term New Model for the period 1250 to 1600. 
 
 
Ancient Model: Logic 
Greek Latin English 
τέχνη Ars1 Art 
πιστήµηπππ Scientia1 Knowledge 
Goal: mimetic representation of reality 
Figure 1. The Ancient Model. 
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In the Hellenistic and Roman periods, Aristotle’s sharp 
distinction between episteme and techne was lost, and the terms 
came to be used interchangeably. Thus, in his influential book 
on education, the late-antique writer Martianus Capella called 
the following the seven “liberal” arts, that is the subjects that 
any free-born (liber) man ought to have mastered: Grammar, 
Dialectic (or Logic), Rhetoric, Geometry, Arithmetic, 
Astronomy and Music. So, for Capella and in western 
universities until the seventeenth century, the arts included 
disciplines such as mathematics and astronomy that we today 
naturally consider sciences. Thus when Galileo came to the 
University of Padua in 1592, he was hired as an “artista,” a 
professor of the art of mathematics, having been recruited by 
Antonio Riccoboni, the professor of Humanities.  
When you finished your bachelor’s degree in one of these arts, 
you then were eligible to proceed to the master’s and doctorate 
in the faculties of medicine, theology, or law. Whatever you 
studied at whatever level, you had to be highly proficient in 
Latin and Greek, since all the textbooks in all disciplines were 
texts by ancient writers such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Galen (on 
the concept of the “arts” see Kristeller, 1990: 163-227; on the 
medieval university, see Le Goff, 1993: 65-166 and Leff, 1992; 
on the Renaissance university, see Grendler, 2002). At this 
phase, then, it would not make sense to talk about “the art of 
science and the science of art,” since art meant science.  
To be clear about our use of these terms, let us call this Art1 
and Science1, and we can say that:  
Art1 = Science1 
Both operated under the Ancient Model of knowledge 
primarily obtained through the tool of logic and aimed at a 
mimetic description of reality. 
 
4 The New Model  
 
When did this paradigm of the branches of knowledge break 
down, and why? Perhaps the key figure was Galileo, who, to 
be sure, was not without his medieval predecessors such as 
Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century. Like Bacon, Galileo 
held that mathematics was “the gate and key” to knowledge 
about the physical world (Crosby, 1997: 68). Unlike Bacon, 
Galileo had many students and lived in the age of 
Gutenberg.  
So Galileo’s readership and influence were far-flung.  
It was Galileo who started a new paradigm of scientific 
research based on the apparently simple idea that you could 
quantify key characteristics of matter such as force, energy 
and mass (figure 2). What had held things up? Aristotle and 
the Ancient Model!  
In his Metaphysics, Aristotle denied point-blank that math could 
be applied to physics. Mathematics is “theoretical” and 
concerns what is eternal and immovable. But physics deals with 
things constantly moving and perishing, which are anything but 
immovable and eternal (Met. 1026a; see, in general, Crosby, 
1997: 12-14). For a Bacon or Galileo to be possible, a new 
model of knowledge was needed.  
Alfred W. Crosby, in his excellent book, The Measure of Reality. 
Quantification and Western Society, 1250-1600, sees this New 
Model gradually evolving in tandem with the introduction of 
the money economy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
Crosby quotes a fourteenth century scholar at Oxford who 
wrote that “every saleable item is at the same time a measured 
item.” Even time came to have a price once it could be divided 
into units smaller and more absolute than the ancient hour, 
whose value fluctuated seasonally and geographically until the 
invention of mechanical clocks around the 1270s (Crosby, 
1997: 84). Within a few centuries, Kepler would compare the 
universe to a vast clockwork. The new device had given birth 
to a new and powerful metaphor (Crosby, 1997: 110-111). And 
let us not forget that Copernicus wrote a treatise on money in 
which he anticipated the quantity theory of money and even 
Gresham’s Law. The New Model, then, is based in part on the 
addition of a second tool to the knowledge worker’s toolkit. 
Next to logic, we now have applied mathematics.  
 
 
New Model: Logic, Mathematics, Visualization 
Greek Latin English 
τέχνη Ars2 Art 
πιστήµηπππ Scientia2 Knowledge 
Goal: mimetic representation of reality 
 
Figure 2. The New Model. 
 
Why could mathematics not have been used as a knowledge-
producing tool in antiquity? Crosby is undoubtedly correct in 
attributing this to the simple fact that in antiquity “its symbols 
and techniques were inadequate” (Crosby, 1997: 110-111). A 
new symbolism was required. With Roman numerals, even the 
procedure of addition was time-consuming. And then there was 
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the lack of the concept of zero. It took until the sixteenth 
century for the Arabic system of numbers and notation to come 
into widespread use in Europe. Until then, we should not be 
surprised to find the knowledge-worker’s toolkit to be limited to 
logic alone. 
Further progress came in the early 1400s with the rediscovery 
Ptolemy’s Geography, with its map of the world, which divided 
the earth into the familiar system of latitude and longitude. This 
gridding of the earth allowed maps to become more and more 
accurate and introduced the idea that space, like time, could be 
divided into small units and measured with precision—not that 
Ptolemy did: his calculations were, in fact, far from accurate, 
which explains why when Columbus got to the New World, he 
thought he was already at the islands off the coast of China, 
some 10,000 miles away (Crosby, 1997: 97-98). A second work 
of Ptolemy, rediscovered around the same time was his He 
Megiste Syntaxis, better known by its Arabic title of Almagest. This 
work presented a detailed geocentric model of the heavens. Its 
inelegant use of epicycles inspired Copernicus in the sixteenth 
century to propose his heliocentric model. Here it is important 
to note three things. First, Copernicus did not primarily base his 
argument on new observations. Second, Copernicus felt licensed 
to propose the heliocentric model because it had already been 
developed in antiquity by Aristarchus of Samos. Hence, his 
attack on Ptolemy does not constitute an early skirmish in the 
Battle of the Ancients and the Moderns, which was to break out 
in France in the next century. It is rather a case of one ancient 
authority pitted against other ancient authorities. Since none of 
the heliocentric texts survived, in a sense Copernicus was 
philologically recon-structing the line of argument they could 
have made. Finally, for Copernicus, the criterion of success in 
his enterprise was less truth than beauty. As he wrote about his 
geocentric predecessors, “…they [could not] elicit or 
deduce…the structure of the universe and the true symmetry of 
its parts. On the contrary, their experience was just like some 
one taking from various places hands, feet, a head, and other 
pieces, very well depicted, it may be, but not for the 
representation of a single person; since these fragments would 
not belong to one another at all, a monster rather than a man 
would be put together from them” (Copernicus 1978). As 
Robert Westman (2008) has noted, Copernicus’ image is based 
on the opening lines of Horace’s Art of Poetry, which compares a 
bad poem to the painting of a monster with the head of a 
woman, neck of a horse, wings of a bird, and tail of a fish.  
Copernicus sees the strength of his alternative theory in the fact 
that it can connect the old data points in a new way so as to 
make the picture of the universe symmetrical and beautiful 
rather than monstrous and ugly. The root of this new criterion 
of truth comes from the fifteenth-century Neoplatonic 
philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. As Dupré showed, in Ficino’s 
thought, Nature is an aesthetic work, and hence to perceive the 
truth of Nature is to perceive its beauty (Dupré 1993: 200-202).  
Oddly, Copernicus’ De revolutionibus had an unintended 
contribution to make to the progress of knowledge: 
unbeknownst to its dying author, Copernicus’ text was edited by 
the theologian Andreas Osiander when it was being prepared 
for the printer in Nuremberg in 1543. Osiander added a preface 
that most readers thought must have been written or at least 
authorized by Copernicus himself. In this text, Osiander called 
the heliocentric theory a hypothesis which “need not be true nor 
even probable; it is sufficient if the calculations agree with the 
observations” (quoted apud Gingerich 2005: 139). Osiander thus 
introduced the powerful concept that a scientific theory could 
be proposed not as a mimetic representation of reality but as a 
thought-experiment or jeu d’esprit (on Osiander’s preface see 
Kusukawa, 1999).  
A key moment in the formation of what Crosby calls the New 
Model occurred in the early seventeenth century. That is when 
Galileo did three things that were to have a powerful effect on 
science down to the present day. He violated Aristotle’s 
injunction against applying mathematics to the study of physical 
objects. Although he made some errors, Galileo undertook 
experiments to establish the time-squared law for uniformly 
accelerated change. He also concluded that objects retain their 
velocity unless a force—such as friction—acts upon them, 
refuting the generally accepted Aristotelian hypothesis that 
objects “naturally” slow down and stop unless a force acts upon 
them. Galileo also showed the power of observation by using 
the new invention of the telescope to visualize the heavens, 
making new discoveries (such as the four, large moons of 
Jupiter) that are impossible for the unaided eye to see. And so a 
third tool entered the knowledge-worker’s toolkit: visual devices 
such as microscopes and telescopes to bring within the range of 
human vision objects too small or distant to be perceivable. 
Once again, the reason for the absence of these tools from the 
Ancient Model is obvious: they did not yet exist. 
I have noted that Osiander’s preface to Copernicus’ De 
revolutionibus characterizes the purpose of the work as a mere 
hypothesis, not a claim that the heliocentric model is an accurate 
mimesis of the solar system. This softer claim is actually not 
very characteristic of practitioners of the New Model. More 
typical is Galileo, who wrote, for example, in the Starry Messenger, 
“I have observed the nature and material of the Milky Way. 
With the aid of the telescope this has been scrutinized so 
directly and with such ocular certainty that all the disputes 
which have vexed philosophers through so many ages have 
been resolved, and we are at last freed from wordy debates 
about it” (Galilei, 1957: 49). “Wordy debates” are, of course, 
Galileo’s disparaging way of referring to the use of logical 
reasoning alone. Armed with the new tool of the telescope, the 
knowledge-worker in the age of the New Model can forward a 
very strong claim to understanding the precise characteristics of 
his object of study. 
Galileo’s contemporary, Kepler, was able to improve on 
Copernicus’ heliocentric model by replacing Copernicus’ circular 
orbits of the planets with ellipses, arriving at this correct 
conclusion solely by use of mathematics and the data of Mars’ 
orbit. Within fifty years of the deaths of Kepler (1630) and 
Galileo (1642), Newton, in the Principia mathematica (1687) was 
able to take Galileo’s terrestrial laws of motion and apply them 
to heavenly bodies such as the Moon and the planets, thereby 
giving a principled explanation for Kepler’s observations about 
planetary motion (cf. Kline, 1967: 337-339). 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Crosby’s new 
quantitative-visual model had been firmly established as 
Newton’s work swept all before it, as Feingold has reminded us 
in his recent book The Newtonian Moment. But the term for this 
branch of knowledge was still philosophy, or natural 
philosophy, not “science.” Not surprisingly,  the full title of 
Newton’s classic work was the Philosophiae Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica, or The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. 
For the sake of terminological clarity, let us call this “Science2.” 
As we have seen, the chief characteristics of science2 are 
quantification, visualization, model-ing, and experimentation. 
Note that these are not always all utilized, but they are all in the 
scientist’s toolkit. For example, in the field of astronomy, 
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experiments were not possible for Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo 
and Newton. At best, they could quantify, observe, model and 
run thought experiments.  
If in the seventeenth century natural philosophy embraced the 
new tools of quantification and visualization, then we may well 
wonder if there was already a foreshadowing of C.P. Snow’s 
opposition of what we today would call art and science. 
Surprisingly, the answer is no.  
Art itself was evolving in the same direction. Indeed, the move 
toward the new model actually occurred in what we now call the 
arts before it occurred in the sciences, and so we now change our 
nomenclature for “art,” too. Starting from fifteenth-century 
Florence, painting had undergone what William Ivins has called 
“the rationalization of sight.” By this concept—which has been 
quite influential among scholars of New Media—he means that 
the imprecise sense of perspective found in much of Roman 
painting and European Gothic painting, starting with Pietro 
Cavallini and Giotto, had undergone a revolution with Leon 
Battista Alberti’s formalization of Brunelleschi’s discovery of a 
simple but logical scheme for pictorial perspective (Ivins, 1975: 
9; on Brunelleschi and Alberti, see [anon.], 2006: 371-378). 
According to Ivins, Alberti’s innovation came from a shift of 
sensibility: for the Greeks, geometric properties were ultimately 
derived from the sense of touch, not vision. This can be 
exemplified by the key issue of perspective painting: the 
treatment of parallel lines. In Euclid, parallel lines, by definition, 
never meet. “If we get our awareness of parallelism through 
touch, as by running our fingers along a simple molding,” writes 
Ivins, “there is no question of the sensuous return that parallel 
lines do not meet. If, however, we get our awareness of 
parallelism through sight, as when we look down a long 
colonnade, there is no doubt about the sensuous return that 
parallel lines do converge and will meet if they are far enough 
extended” (Ivins, 1975: 8). The famous Albertian window used 
in perspective painting since the mid fifteenth century reflects 
exactly the same powerful combination of tools seen 150 years 
later in the work of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton: mathematics 
and visualization. And as in the work of those natural 
philosophers, the criterion for success was, of course, beauty 
and the goal the mimetic representation of Nature. 
The invention of perspective was not simply a technical 
innovation useful for painters and architects. By a circuitous 
route that started with the engineer-architect Girard Desargues 
and his student Blaise Pascal in the seventeenth century, it led in 
the nineteenth century to the development of projective 
geometry, of which Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries 
are special cases (Kline, 1967: 232-249). As Morris Kline put it, 
“this subject born of art makes its primary contribution to 
mathematics as an art” (Kline, 1967: 248). Of course, this story 
about how modern geometry developed in the positive 
interaction of fine artists and scientists has many, many more 
twists and turns. Those interested can be referred for the details 
to the splendid account in Martin Kemp’s book, The Science of 
Art, whose premise is (to quote the Introduction) “that there 
were special kinds of affinity between the central intellectual and 
observational concerns in the visual arts and the sciences in 
Europe from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century” 
(Kemp, 1990: 1).  
Crosby’s “New Model,” which we have called science2, is first 
attested two centuries earlier in the fine art of painting, whose 
theoretician was Leon Battista Alberti and whose poster boy 
was Leonardo da Vinci. At this point, then, we also must 
distinguish this sense of the word “art” from art1. We have 
called it art2.  Here, again, we find that art and science are not 
polar opposites, as they were in Snow’s essay. Of course, we are 
now using the word “art” in the sense of the “fine arts,” not in 
the sense of art1, the traditional liberal arts of Grammar, Logic, 
Rhetoric, etc. That sense was not to develop before Vasari, who 
in his Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors and Architects, 
coined the term “le arti del disegno,” the “arts of design,” or what 
the French were to call the beaux arts and what we call in English 
the “fine arts.” Since the universities had no place for them, 
painters, sculptors and architects banded together in academies, 
of which the first was started in 1563 by Vasari himself in his 
native Florence (cf. Kristeller, 1990: 181-183).  
At this point, we can begin to detect a divergence between the 
old liberal artists and the new fine artists and natural 
philosophers. The liberal artists show few signs of rebelling 
against what Crosby called the Old Model that was pre-
quantitative and non-visual. There are, to be sure, some 
exceptions such as Pierre de la Ramée, better known as Petrus 
Ramus, who developed a new, anti-Aristotelian logic in mid 
sixteenth-century Paris and who loved to make his points 
through the use of illustrative diagrams (Ong, 1958). Ramus’ 
influence is hotly debated: Walter Ong downplayed it (Ong, 
1962: 79-80; see also Sellberg, 2006); Ernst Cassirer and, more 
recently, Timothy Reiss, see a direct line connecting Ramus to 
Bacon, Galileo and ultimately to Frege (Reiss, 2000: 54-55).  
On the other hand, even the old artists of grammar, rhetoric, 
logic, and ethics were somewhat affected by the spirit of the age, 
which, after all was the Renaissance and the time when 
humanism flourished. For the humanists studying the Greek 
and Latin authors, it was not yet possible to use the tool of 
quantification, let alone of experimentation. For that, we have to 
await the late twentieth century and the development of the 
fields of quantitative linguistics, literary stylometrics, and virtual 
archaeology. But it was possible to challenge ancient authority, 
as Galileo did; and by the early nineteenth century it would be 
possible to visualize textual data in the form of the genealogy of 
manuscripts, or the discipline we call stemmatics (Bordalejo, 
2006).  
As in the case of the fine arts, in challenging ancient authority 
the liberal artists were far ahead of the scientists. Probably the 
greatest challenge made by a Humanist to ancient authority 
occurred in 1440 when Lorenzo Valla used legal, linguistic and 
historical arguments to challenge the authenticity of the 
Donation of Constantine. This was a key text upon which the 
primacy and power of the Bishop of Rome rested because in it 
the Emperor Constantine the Great allegedly gave Pope 
Sylvester I and his successors ownership of property in Rome, 
Italy, and in other provinces of the Roman empire including 
Judea, Greece, and Africa. Valla’s challenge set off a chain 
reaction that, as noted by Hans Küng (1996), caused a paradigm 
shift in Christianity. Before Valla, authority flowed from the 
Pope in Rome. After Valla, Martin Luther and John Calvin, 
authority was rooted in the Bible. No wonder that in sixteenth-
century Italy, there was a saying: “scuola di grammatica, scuola 
di eresia” (see the chapter with this title in Seidel-Menchi, 1987), 
or, “school of humanities, school of heresy.” 
As for the visualization tool called stemmatics, it took centuries 
of groundwork by philologists following in the wake of 
humanists such as Valla and Erasmus until the breakthrough 
could occur in 1850 with the publication of Karl Lachmann’s 
edition of the ancient Latin poet Lucretius. Lachmann was able 
to show the family descent of the surviving manuscripts and to 
take an imaginative leap beyond the surviving witnesses of the 
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text to derive the characteristics of their common ancestor, or 
what we call the archetype. Lachmann was able to show that this 
lost manuscript, called Omega, contained 302 pages with 26 lines 
to a page. He was also showed that the archetype was a copy of 
a manuscript written in a minuscule hand, which in itself was a 
copy of a manuscript of the 4th or 5th centuries written in rustic 
capitals. These results were astounding and constituted a kind of 
reverse-engineering of the thousand-year process of scribal 
copying. Since Lachmann, the use of a genealogical table to 
visualize the family relationships of the manuscripts of ancient 
authors has become a standard practice. Sometimes the picture 
that emerges can be quite complicated. But precisely for that 
reason visualization has proven to be a useful technique in the 
field of stemmatics because it makes apparent emergent 
properties that might otherwise get lost in the overwhelming 
mass of data (cf. West, 1973: 7-59). In the field of archaeology, 
we had to wait over a century for a similar breakthrough in data 
visualization. I refer to the Harris matrix, which was invented in 
1973 (Harris, 1989). We might note that in the field of the old 
liberal arts, the criterion of success was never beauty, a concept 
not part of the humanists’ critical vocabulary before the 
development of the new field of aesthetics in the eighteenth 
century (Kristeller, 1990: 186, 196-204). 
 
5 The Modern Model  
 
As noted, Lachmann lived in the nineteenth century, and this 
was the time when Crosby’s New Model started to pass out of 
fashion. Some of the major features that a detailed version of 
this paper would have to delve into include the development of 
the modern research university by Wilhelm von Humboldt; the 
resulting explosion of specialized knowledge with an attendant 
breakdown in communication, ultimately leading to C.P. Snow’s 
two-culture thesis (for the influence of the Germanic model in 
the U.S.A. see Lucas, 2006: 177-181); rapid progress in basic 
scientific knowledge leading to what can be called the M o de r n  
Model for science; and inevitable repercussions positive and 
negative on the artists of both the ancient and of the modern 
model.  If language reflects consciousness, then it is doubtless 
significant that it was toward the end of the nineteenth century 
that the term “science” in its contemporary sense replaced the 
ancient term “natural philosophy” still used by Galileo, Newton, 
and all the other early modern researchers in this field.  
Let us start with what, for lack of a better term, I have called the 
Modern Model (figure 3). Crosby’s account ends in 1600 so we 
should not be surprised that by the late 19th century his New 
Model had been replaced. The key development this time is less 
the addition of new tools to the knowledge-worker’s toolkit than 
the end to which they are employed. Instead of the mimetic goal 
of the arts and sciences of the New Model, now scientists 
understood their tasks to be not so much modeling reality as 
exploring the properties and limits of the models themselves. We 
may simplify and say that play replaces mimesis, though we 
hasten to note that play can be a very serious thing, as scholars 
of play (Smith, 1984; Huizinga, 1955) and a popular cultural 
critic such as Steven Johnson—author of the popular book 




Modern Model: Logic, Mathematics, Visualization, Thought Experiments 
Greek Latin English 
τέχνη Ars3 Art 
πιστήµηπππ Scientia3 Knowledge 
Goal: playful representation 
 
Figure 3. The Modern Model. 
 
“Science3” is what we may call this new, ludic kind of science, 
of which Osiander was the harbinger. 
An early influential exponent of the Modern Model was the late 
nineteenth-century physicist Ernst Mach, who wrote: 
If ordinary ‘matter’ must be regarded merely as a 
highly natural, unconsciously constructed mental 
symbol for a relatively stable complex of  sensational 
elements, much more must this be the case  with the 
artificial hypothetical atoms and mole-cules of  
physics and chemistry. The value of these implements 
for their special, limited purposes is not one whit 
destroyed.  As before, they remain eco-nomical ways 
of symbolizing experience. But…we are on our guard 
now, even in the province of physics, against over-
estimating the value of our symbols (Mach, 1914: 
310). 
So for Mach, as for Ockham and the nominalists of medieval 
philosophy (Dupré, 1990: 39-40),  the work of scientists is a 
mental construct, and it is going too far to take concepts like 
atoms and molecules as really existing parts of reality. Of 
course, in Mach’s lifetime, atoms could not yet be seen under 
the microscope. That was not to happen until the 
development in the twentieth century of the electron 
microscope and the One-Ångstrom Microscope. Moreover, 
as a brilliant student of optical illusions, Mach had reason to 
distrust the evidence of the senses. And if Mach downplayed 
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the role of observation, he also was dismissive of logic as a 
tool of discovery. 
 Thus syllogism and induction do not create new knowledge, 
but merely make sure that there is no contradiction between 
our various insights and show clearly how these are 
connected, and lead our attention to different sides of some 
particular insight, teaching us to recognize it in different 
forms. Obviously, then, the genuine source from which the 
enquirer gains knowledge must lie elsewhere (cited apud 
Pojman, 2008).  
So in his version of the Modern Model, the emphasis 
necessarily falls on mathematics and modeling. The poster 
boy for this was, of course, Albert Einstein. 
As Science3 developed and succeeded, it caught the interest of 
government, especially in time of war. The most obvious 
example is the Manhattan Project, which gave us the atom 
bomb and proved that Einstein’s famous thought experiments 
of roty years earlier were very serious and deadly games indeed. 
The atomic bomb reminds us that the game of the modern 
model was one that was not arbitrary and purely fanciful but 
was played according to the rules of the “falsifiability” principle 
of Karl Popper (Popper, 1965). It also reminds us that by now 
science had evolved from the activity of isolated indivudals or 
small research groups into a large-scale, collaborative Enterprise. 
According to the US government, at its peak, the Manhattan 
Project employed more than 130,000 people 
(www.cfo.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/retro spect. htm).  In the 
era of Big Science (Weinberg, 1961), collaborative research by 
teams of researchers has become the norm. Scientific papers no 
longer have a single author, and lists of dozens or hundreds of 
co-authors are by no means unusual. 
Meanwhile, other knowledge-workers were implicitly operating 
on the assumption that if scientific research is a mental 
construct, then it need not necessarily take its point of departure 
from observations of reality but can become a self-reflexive 
activity. By “self-reflexive” I mean that it can take the methods 
and procedures of science and imagine what would happen if 
the reality-based constraints were removed. The clearest 
example of this is non-Euclidean geometry, which was 
developed in the 1820s and 30s by Bolyai and Lobachevsky. It 
takes as its point of departure the assumption that parallel lines 
do meet and works out the consequences. Bolyai “ends his work 
by mentioning that it is not possible to decide through 
mathematical reasoning alone if the geometry of the physical 
universe is Euclidean or non-Euclidean; this is a task for the 
physical sciences” (anon., 2009A). Of course, twentieth-century 
physics did find that in certain respects the universe is non-
Euclidean and that non-Euclidean geometry—especially as 
developed by Riemann—is thus very useful. But in terms of the 
research program of the Modern Model, that is almost beside 
the point. In the early twentieth century, we can cite the 
mathematics of David Hilbert, who held that “mathematics 
is…a series of games” (Anglin, 1996).   
In the fine arts, too, a major shift had occurred away from 
mimesis toward ludic self-reflexivity, which we may call Art3. 
This is doubtless related to the invention of the daguerreotype 
in the 1830s and the even better calotype, invented by William 
Henry Fox Talbot in the 1840s. Now, for reality to be outputted 
through the use of optics or optical theory no longer required 
the assistance of an artist. Instead, visual data could pass 
through a lens and be recorded directly onto a photographic 
plate or film. Stereographic photographs were even given the 
status of “wholly reliable transcriptions of retinal images, 
themselves unfailing equivalents to the external world they 
signified” (Schiavo, 2003: 127). As Walter Benjamin (1968) put 
it, “photography freed the hand of the most important artistic 
functions which henceforth devolved only upon the eye looking 
into a lens.” And, as Benjamin also noted, once freed, the hand 
of the artist no longer had to operate as the last cog in the wheel 
of mimesis. Instead, it could carry out the commands of the 
artist, who replaced the doctrine of mimesis with that of  “l’art 
pour l’art, that is, with a theology of art” (Benjamín, 1968). Like 
Modern Science, modern art becomes ludically self-reflexive, 
more about itself than about nature. The history of modern art 
thus becomes the history of an ever-changing series of 
doctrines—Impressionism gives way to Cubism, Cubism to 
Dadaism, Dadaism to Surrealism, Surrealism to Abstract 
Expressionism, and on and on without stop, let us hope—at 
least if you enjoy the show as much as I do! 
And what about artists in the original sense of humanists in the 
fields of grammar, rhetoric, and logic? Here, too, we can detect 
the Modern Model. This is particularly the case in philosophy, 
hermeneutics, and the sociology of knowledge, the foundational 
fields that inspire the day-to-day work of specialists in the 
various humanistic subdisciplines. All three are based on the 
same key idea found in Mach and in modern fine arts that the 
name of the game is reflexivity. In philosophy, one thinks here 
of Wittgenstein’s late Philosophical Investigations, where the 
concept of the “Sprachspiel,” or “language game,” plays a key 
role. The Mach of modern humanists was perhaps the 
Heidelberg philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who died in 
2002.  His key work was published in 1960 with the ironic title, 
Wahrheit und Methode, “truth and method.” The irony consists in 
the fact that, as was the case in Mach’s system, in Gadamer’s 
there is no method in the humanities that leads us to true 
knowledge in the sense of a mimetic repre-sentation of reality. 
Each individual lives in a set of particular historical 
circumstances that determine his behavior and outlook. When 
another individual—say a scholar in the humanities—looks back 
and tries to understand a text, painting, or other creation left by 
someone who lived in a different set of circumstances, there is 
no possibility of a completely shared understanding. This does 
not mean that we cannot understand a text, painting, or other 
human creation; only that we cannot understand it as its original 
author intended. We always understand it in our own way, no 
matter how much we try to be “objective,” that is, to employ an 
historical method. Moreover, the work of art has a special 
property: it evokes a response in us and issues a challenge to us. 
Through interpreting a great intellectual achievement of the 
past, we do not simply express who we were before we opened 
the title page; we become transformed in our dialogical 
encounter with the object we are studying. In Gadamer, the 
work of art thus functions as Nature does in Mach: it is subject 
to interpretation, to what we might call “modeling,” but not to 
straightforward mimetic transcription by a knowledge-worker in 
the manner of Galileo confidently describing the Milky Way, or 
Harris meticulously sorting out the relationships of all the 
stratigraphic deposits on an archaeological site. 
 
6 The Postmodern Model  
 
I conclude with our situation today, which is characterized by a 
Postmodern Model (figure 4). Like all preceding models, this 
model is not all-pervasive but sits atop archaic survivals of its 
   Virtual Archaeology Review 
 
 
VAR. Volumen 2 Número 4. ISSN: 1989-9947 
Mayo 2011 
26 
predecessors, giving rise to a rich if seemingly contradictory 
state of affairs characterized both by neo-skepticism and neo-
positivism in the arts and sciences. In the Postmodern model, 
the goal is no longer primarily play constrained by rules but 
playful, ironic self-consciousness. And its new discovery tool is 
informatics, an outgrowth of the Computer Revolution that 
started before World War II and took off in the post-war 
period. Informatics has been defined as “the study of the 
structure, algorithms, behavior, and interactions of natural and 
artificial systems that store, process, access and communicate 
information” (Wikipedia, “Informatics,” seen June 15, 2009). 
The science that results from using this new tool we may call 
Science4. 
If Crosby was the theoretician of the New Model, then Thomas 
Kuhn with his influential “paradigm theory” of science plays 
that role for the postmodern model. According to Kuhn’s 
famous book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, first published 
in 1962, previous understanding of what science is was too 
often determined by reading textbooks (Kuhn, 1970: 10: Ziman, 
1978: 38-42),  not the actual communications of scientists. 
When we approach science through textbooks, everything is 
compendious and clear. Science marches ever onward and 
upward without error or detour. But that gives a very artificial 
sense of what science is really about, how it really happens. If 
the data of the theoretician of science focus on the process 
rather than the product, what is striking is less the neatness and 
positive results of science than its messiness and tentativeness. 
No discovery or theory is ever final; everything is subject to 
doubt, the requirement of replication, and the fate of 
reintegration into a new theory, or what Kuhn termed a 
“paradigm.” Science is made by knowledge-workers organized 
into communities that are self-validating. Within these 
communities, all goes well during periods of what Kuhn calls 
“normal science” when a reigning paradigm accords well with 
the experimental results. But when this breaks down, a crisis and 
a “paradigm shift” inevitably occur. Moreover, the crisis may 
not arise only from discrepant data but from a change in world 
view. The world is seen differently, and different things are seen 
in the world. The paradigm shift involves a new metaphor that 
reorganizes the scene and exerts itself by force of its beauty, its 
aesthetics (Kuhn, 1970: 155).   
Applying the lessons of Gestalt psychology—traceable to Mach’s 
work on optical illusions—Kuhn shows how scientific 
revolutions can also arise from new ways of interpreting the text 
of Nature—something that Gadamer might have noted was an 
inevitable feature of the human condition. So the evolution of 
science is inevitable and unrelenting. This might lead to the 
depressing thought that all scientific knowledge is relative, that 
is, temporary. In the second edition of his book (1970), Kuhn 
tackled that head-on and came up with a Gadamerian answer: 
yes, in a sense all science is relative, but from the point of view 
of an individual or a particular generation of scientists you can 
still achieve the best theory possible given the state of the 
evidence and the compatibility of the theory with all other 
dominant theories in related branches of science. Relativity will 
mainly occur after your death, and even if it occurs while you are 
still alive, that is nothing to get depressed about because, 
according to Kuhn, scientists at heart are “puzzle-solvers” 
(Kuhn, 1970: 35-42, 206).  Like devotees of crossword puzzles, 
they get pleasure from confronting ever-new puzzles to solve. I 
need hardly point out that puzzles are games, so Kuhn’s theory 
has a strong ludic element. I would characterize it as 
simultaneously neoskeptical and neopositivistic. For the 
individual, it presents a view of science in which positive 
knowledge can be obtained; looking at the longue durée, Kuhn’s 
picture is skeptical about the persistence of any single brick in 




Postmodern Model: Logic, Mathematics, Visualization, Thought Experiments, Informatics 
Greek Latin English 
τέχνη Ars4 Art 
πιστήµηπππ Scientia4 Knowledge 
Goal: interactive representation 
 
Figure 4. The Postmodern Model. 
 
 
Of course, since Kuhn’s book appeared, the scientists have 
continued solving the crossword puzzle of Nature with no sign 
of any slowdown caused by mental depression. To the contrary, 
the collaborative teams characteristic of Big Science in the 
Modern Model have become what Caroline Wagner calls the 
Invisible College of massive numbers of scientists dispersed 
around the world linked by the Internet where they apply grid 
computing to ambitious collaborative projects  (Wagner, 2008: 
1-14).  The central, enabling role of informatics in such new 
scientific projects is striking. 
 
The field of physics gives us an excellent example: CERN’s 
Large Hadron Collider, or LHC. In the LHC, two beams of 
hadrons will shoot in opposite directions through the 
accelerator. When the beams collide, the energy will be high 
enough to simúlate conditions in the early universe. The 
particles that are generated may confirm or force revision of the 
Standard Model. These collisions are detected by sensors whose 
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data are digitally expressed and processed at a rate of an 
estimated 300 GB/second, 27 TB/day, or 15 PB/year. They are 
so massive that they have to be culled for “interesting events” at 
an estimated rate of 300 MB/second in order to be processed 
by software and made available to thousands of scientists tied 
remotely to CERN through the LHC Computing Grid 
(http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/LHC/ LHC-en.html, seen June 
10, 2009). In other words, in postmodern physics, scientists 
study not the immediate sensory presentations of Nature but 
their digital representation. If these are created in a methodical, 
accurate way, the results can be no less valid than what can be 
learned from their real-world equivalents. But, of course, in 
postmodern science, the real-world objects of study are 
generally not subject to direct observation and manipulation 
because of constraints of time, distance, or scale. 
Physics is not the only field where we can see this informatic 
turn. With the decipherment of the human genome, humanity 
has become self-conscious of its own coding and integration 
into the biosphere. The new fields of bioinformatics and 
computational biology have emerged in recent decades at the 
very center of the life sciences, bringing us such research 
programs as genomic sequencing, comparative genomics, and 
the modeling of biological systems, to name just a few hot areas. 
This is because, as with the LHC’s subatomic particles, the 
genomic code is understood not directly but through its digital 
representations, and these are analyzed computationally. Thus, 
with the introduction of informatics, biology moves from a 
discipline primarily devoted to observation and experimentation 
to one reliant for new advances on the manipulation and 
analysis of digital data and models. 
As with the previous three models, we once again find parallel 
developments in the fine and liberal arts. Specialized shows such 
as Ars Electronica and SIGGRAPH regularly feature the work 
of digital artists. They are also gaining access to our major 
museums. In 2008, the foyer to the Getty Center featured Tim 
Hawkinson’s Überorgan, a large multimedia structure combining 
balloons, pipes, and music. The music is based on hymns, 
fragments of which are randomly activated by sensors as viewers 
pass by the installation. The artist describes it as follows: 
…the switches reinterpret the [musical] score. One 
would kind of flip-flop the orientation of the notes to 
the keyboard so that what's normally played at the 
high end is played at the low end. Another switch is 
the key that it's played in. All these switches are being 
activated kind of spontaneously just by viewers going 
through the space so there's no telling when it's going 
to shift. And so it really is played out a different way 
each time someone passes through (Hawkinson, 
2008). 
As those of us who have been fortunate enough to experience it 
can attest, the Überorgan plays for us and with us. Those who 
have not seen it can enjoy it vicariously on YouTube. Works of 
art like the Überorgan are excellent emblems of the informatic 
and interactive spirit of our age, which they both reflect and 
help to create. They also exemplify irony, as does much of body 
and performance art of the past several decades: they can never 
be repeated and only rarely preserved or documented. If one of 
the original drives behind the creation of art was an individual’s 
desire to leave a mark or to create a monument recording his 
existence, then postmodern art does not fulfill this basic human 
need. But what postmodern art is good at doing is transcending 
the boundary betwen the individual artist and his audience. 
Now, the audience participates in the performance and helps 
co-create the art as it is experienced in ever new ways. And 
postmodern art also clearly illustrates how the boundaries 
between science, art, and technology have become very blurred. 
We may call it Art4. 
Play: The Video Games World was an enormous show with over 
300 video games held at the Palazzo delle Esposizioni in Rome 
in 2002. In the summer of 2008, the Vancouver Art Museum 
held a show dedicated in part to video games as art, with 
exhibition of games such as the Sims, Grand Theft Auto, and 
Super Mario World. Increasingly, the game is not only the spirit 
of art, as it was in the Modern Model, but its very content. But 
in contrast to pre-digital games, the new games are interactive, 
with shifts of situation caused either by the human players, the 
randomized algorithms of the game, or both. The new 
postmodern aesthetic is thus no longer based on the traditional 
concept of mimetic content wrapped in a static, simple and 
symmetrical Beauty, on Kant’s notion of the aesthetic 
experience as “disinterested contemplation”  by an isolated 
viewer (Kant, 1982, para. 1-22). It is grounded instead on the 
aesthetic object’s ability to engage through dynamism, 
adventure, imagination, and curiosity-arousal in a social context. 
One might make the case that the new aesthetic is indeed a 
conscious and enthusiastic embrace of Horace’s monster, an 
impulse, “to destroy beauty,” as the artist Barnett Newman 
characterized modern art in 1948 (apud M. J. Milliner). But we 
must also note that the new aesthetic is also Gadamerian in 
emphasizing the dialogical relationship of the observer, the 
other, and the art-object.  
We should note in this regard that along with the new aesthetics 
is a complementary new anthropology associated with the 
discovery of mirror neurons by neuroscientists. In brief, a 
mirror neuron is: 
…a neuron which fires both when an animal acts and 
when the animal observes the same action performed by 
another animal (especially by another animal of the same 
species). Thus, the neuron ‘mirrors’ the behavior of 
another animal, as though the observer were itself 
acting. These neurons have been directly observed in 
primates, and are believed to exist in humans and other 
species including birds. In humans, brain activity 
consistent with mirror neurons has been found in the 
premotor cortex and the inferior parietal cortex ([anon., 
2009B]. 
The first consequence of this discovery  is the realization that 
mimesis is itself a game—indeed the first, constitutive primate 
game, which begins in humans in the first minutes after birth 
(Iacoboni, 2008: 47, 49). The second is that there is no isolated 
individual but only a constant redefinition of the individual self 
as it interacts with another self (Iacoboni, 2008: 133, 257). The 
third is that intersubjectivity is neurological (Iacoboni, 2008: 
152, 155, 262-265). The fourth is that interactivity—whether 
real or virtual—is an essential part of what makes us human. 
This fact alone justifies the enormous project currently 
underway to make our media interactive (see Svanaes, 2000) and 
suggests that the future of virtual archaeology is bright indeed. 
The interactive digital cultural object is an expression and agent 
of our sense of cultural identity. With this realization comes a 
duty: it is incumbent on us as virtual archaeologists to 
understand the phrase “our sense of cultural identity” in as 
cosmopolitan a way as possible. Otherwise, the wonderful tool 
of interactive digital cultural objects can quickly become a 
weapon used by one particular culture  to promote itself against 
all the others (Frischer, 2006). 
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In the humanities we have passed through the neoskeptical 
phase of poststructuralism when theoreticians like Jacques 
Derrida and Umberto Eco have wondered whether there is any 
method or criterion to limit how we interpret a work of art; or 
if, as Eco asked, it is “open-ended universe where the 
interpreter can discover infinite interconnections” (Eco, 1992: 
39-40).  But next to this skepticism run riot we also have 
something akin to the Large Hadron Collider, the so-called 
digital humanities generally and virtual archaeology in particular. 
Of course, since we are talking about the humanities,  long the 
poor cousin of academic disciplines, we are comparing a 
mountain to a mouse in terms of the scale of the enterprise and 
its cost.  
The digital humanities can be defined as the application of 
information technology as an aid to fulfill the humanities’ basic 
tasks of preserving, reconstructing, transmitting, and 
interpreting the human record. The striking thing about this 
new field is how it has revolutionized many humanistic 
disciplines, making them resemble the natural sciences more 
than ever before in their long history. A case in point concerns 
collaborative research, something very rare in the humanities as 
recently as ten or twenty years ago. Now collaborative projects 
are sprouting up all over. The most impressive example is, of 
course, Wikipedia, started by Jimmy Wales in 2001.  It proves 
what can be done, and how fast it can be done, when you invite 
the collaboration of just about everyone who is literate and 
speaks one of the world’s major languages. 
Digital humanists utilize advanced technology in various ways. 
Perhaps the most obvious way is simply the conversion of their 
objects of study—texts, paintings, buildings, and even whole 
cities—to digital format. Generally, this is quite simple and 
straightforward, and involves use of a new device that has 
revolutionized the field of archaeology: the 3D scanner. But 
sometimes 3D digitization is very difficult, as, for example, 
happened with our institute’s complex project to digitize the 
Plastico di Roma antica, a enormous physical model of Rome in 
320 CE (Guidi, Frischer, et al., 2007; Guidi, Frischer, et al., 
2008). And even 2D digitization can sometimes still pose 
enormous challenges,  as happens when you are trying to 
recover an ancient text scratched off a medieval manuscript, 
covered with another text, and then further damaged by fire. In 
pre-digital times, the only way such a scratched-off text—or 
“palimpsest”—could be read was if enough of the original 
letters survived that it could still be seen; or, if not, if you could 
pick up any faint traces through the use of ultraviolet light. But 
in the last decade, multispectral imaging has been employed with 
great success on a range of manuscripts. The most impressive 
example I can cite is the project to recover the texts of 
Archimedes and other ancient authors under the text of a 
thirteenth century monk’s prayer book. Besides the normal 
difficulties encountered in reading any palimpsest, this particular 
medieval book presented the additional challenge that it was 
“charred by fire [and] devoured by mold” (Netz and Noel, 2007: 
4). To read it, the humanist team of Reviel Netz and William 
Noel had to obtain the use of a powerful beam of synchrotron 
X-rays from the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center.  
Scanning an object like a text or painting generally does not 
require such innovation and advanced hardware, but now that 
we have so many tens of thousands of digital representations of 
the artifacts humanists study, it is possible and even acceptable 
for the first time for humanists to use the tools of quantitative 
analysis, data-mining, modeling, and visualization. That is, like 
our colleagues in the sciences, we are able to make new 
discoveries by using digital technology to manipúlate and 
analyze the digitized representations of the objects we study.  
Last year, I co-edited a book of pioneering studies showing how 
our new 2D and 3D technologies can act not simply as 
representations of knowledge but as tools for new discoveries 
(Frischer, Dakouri-Hild 2008). As an example, I would cite 
David Koller’s project to scan in 3D and algorithmically 
reconstruct the 1200 fragments of an amazing map of ancient 
Rome made in about A.D. 210 at the enormous scale of 1:240. 
Thus far, Koller has published more than 20 joins (Koller et al., 
2005; Koller et al., 2006; Koller, 2008), an amazing feat when 
you consider that scholars have been using traditional 
methods—their eyes and hands—to find joins for over four 
hundred years, so you would think that there are not still very 
many discoveries to be made.  
The application of information technology in the humanities has 
also resulted in qualitative change to the way in which humanists 
have understood their central tasks of preserving, transmitting, 
and interpreting the cultural monuments of the past. Thus, from 
the Alexandrian librarians to Lachmann and other Classicists 
working in the Age of Gutenberg, philology was focused on 
reconstruction of the earliest version of an author’s text and, 
ideally, of the autograph itself. This goal is understandable from 
many points of view, not least of all technological: when a text 
must be written in ink on a piece of papyrus or printed in ink on 
a piece of paper, then each word must be indelibly correct with 
respect to some base text. So the editor must make a single 
choice of which phase in the often long history of a text he will 
use as his base text. For the past twenty-two hundred years, 
since the Alexandrian librarian-editors Zenodotus and 
Callimachus, this choice has almost always come down in favor 
of the author’s autograph or at least (if this is lost) the closest 
copy to the autograph. But in this decade, a new approach to 
philological editing has been developed—appropriately enough 
for Homer, the touchstone of the Alexandrians. Called a 
“multitext,” this is a method that takes full advantage of one of 
the prime differences between print and digital publication, viz., 
the letters displayed on a computer monitor can be almost 
instantaneously changed. Based at the Center for Hellenic 
Studies in Washington, D.C., the “Homer Multitext” (Dué and 
Ebbott, 2007) has been described as follows: 
Instead of choosing between variants and ‘plus verses’ 
in an attempt to recover the ipsissima verba of Homer, 
we include them in a multitext format that embraces 
the fluidity of the textual traditions of the Iliad and 
Odyssey. The ideal medium for a multitext of Homer 
is not a traditional printed text but an electronic, web-
based edition. Unlimited in its ability to handle 
complex sets of variants, an electronic multitext offers 
critical readers of Homer the opportunity to consider 
many possible texts at various stages of transmission. 
It allows the reader to select and navigate between 
multiple modes of transmission, and to recover a 
more accurate and accessible picture of the fluidity of 
the textual traditions in their earliest stages 
(www.stoa.org/chs/). 
One can easily predict that the multitext approach to editing will 
spread throughout the humanities. It is based on the valid 
insight that, in the end, the author’s autograph (still worth 
striving to reconstruct, even with the multitextual approach, as a 
valid stage in the history of the text!) is simply one of many 
versions, each of which has its validity, history, and impact. 
Indeed, what makes a text “classic” is, among other features, 
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precisely the fact that its textual transmisión is long and 
complex: that is to say, the text has repeatedly become fixed and 
influential in different versions in ever-changing cultural 
situations. Digital technology is the perfect support for editing a 
text that does full justice to its classic stature.  
In the humanities, as in the fine arts and physical sciences, digital 
technology is not only used to provide tools of discovery and 
communication but also interactive feedback. The work of 
digital humanities scholarship is never finished any more than is 
Hawkinson’s Überorgan, a game of Grand Theft Auto, or an 
experiment in genomics or physics. The virtualizing of reality, 
and—via the virtual communities enabled by the Internet—of 
ourselves—means that we can study both Nature and its digital 
representation with equal confidence; indeed, we can no longer 
distinguish between the direct presentations of the senses and 
the processed presentations of our hardware, since today almost 
nothing is unprocessed (Frischer, 2008). True to our nature 
constituted by mirror neurons, we can enter into an endless loop 
of dialogue with our data, our virtual data, and our virtual 
colleagues. The endless dialogue that for Gadamer and 
Modernism played itself out between interpreter and object of 
interpretation from historical situation to situation now has 
become an embedded feature of postmodern culture. Or at least 
we have the opportunity to do so if we design our digital 
projects in ways that are “wiki”-based, which is to say open to 
contributions and modification by our users. In the case of 
virtual archaeology, this is the reason that my research team has 
been studying how we might create the world’s first online, peer-
reviewed journal in which digital archaeologists can publish their 
3D digital models of cultural heritage monuments and sites in 
such a way that they can be run in real time. We call the 
proposed journal “SAVE,” which stands for “Serving and 
Archiving Virtual Environments” (www.iath.virginia.edu/ 
save/).  
There are already several outlets where scholars can publish 
articles about their 3D models, illustrated by still shots or screen 
captures of video fly-throughs. SAVE will offer scholars the 
opportunity of publishing their models to the Internet with full 
interactivity, so that users can explore them at will. It will also 
offer peer-review, and require all models to be accompanied by 
metadata, documentation, and a related article or monograph 
explaining the history of the monument and its state of 
preservation, as well as an account of the modeling project itself. 
SAVE will furthermore provide secure transmission of the 3D 
models over the Internet, thereby protecting contributors' 
intellectual property. 
SAVE is based on the model of "prosumption," a blurring of 
the gap between producers and customers in a situation where 
"customers participate in the creation of products in an active 
and ongoing way" (Tapscott and Williams, 2006: 126). The 
classic example cited by Tapscott and Williams is Second Life, 
which "has no preset script—and few limitations on what 
players can do. Residents create just about everything, from 
virtual storefronts and nightclubs to clothing, vehicles, and other 
items for use in the game" (ibid.). 
SAVE might be thought of as Second Life for scholars. If 
Second Life harnesses human imagination to create a fictional 
world primarily for purposes of collaborative diversion and 
entertainment, SAVE intends to harness human creativity, 
disciplined by historical methodology, to recreate, with the 
greatest possible fidelity, the historical cultures that once actually 
existed across the globe. Thus the project of SAVE can be 
understood to mean collaboratively building up a virtual space-
time machine that, absent true time travel, will offer scholars, 
students, and the general public the best opportunity we are ever 
likely to have to visualize the lost monuments and worlds of the 
past. That this activity is often carried on under the sign of 
“serious games” and “virtual worlds” is an indication of how 
closely the presuppositions of virtual archaeology reflect the 
Zeitgeist of the postmodern age.  
So now, no less than in previous centuries, the boundaries 
between the arts and sciences are porous. For the first time on 
any large scale, scientists, technologists, artists and humanists 
are collaborating on projects that are epic in scale or in impact. 
On a more profound level, the similarity of the arts and sciences 
in tools and methods is becoming closer than ever. Of course, 
this does not mean that there are not exceptions. Indeed, this 
does not mean that the collaboration and similarity of which I 
speak is still exceptional. Earlier models in the sciences and 
arts—even the Ancient Model—continue to be applied by 
individual scholars. The adoption of the Postmodern Model is 
occurring at different rates in different fields and in different 
locations. But that there is a Post-modern Model more or less 
with the features I have described seems to me undeniable.  
I think it is safe to conclude by asserting that if C. P. Snow were 
alive to observe how things have evolved since he gave the Rede 
Lecture fifty years ago, he would be very pleased, indeed, by this 
convergence between the arts and sciences. His lecture set off  a 
debate in many countries about the need for general education 
requirements, interdisciplinary studies, and the like. By the 
1970s, the reforms Snow called for  were largely in place, at least 
in the United States. The timing could not have been better. 
When the Information Revolution occurred in the last decades 
of the twentieth century, a cadre of knowledge-workers was in 
place who had the training and values needed to apply what they 
had learned to exploit the new opportunities for communication 
and discovery afforded by digital technology.  
So, I conclude by affirming that we owe a great debt of gratitude 
to C. P. Snow for his largely successful effort to open the door 
separating the disciplines of the sciences from those of the arts, 
but I must also note that, in the light of the relationship of art 
and science in the western world since the ancient Greeks, this 
door was relatively easy to push open.  
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